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Abstract 
The current social dilemma literature lacks theoretical consensus regarding how individuals 
behave when facing multiple simultaneous social dilemmas. The divided-loyalty hypothesis, from 
organizational theory, predicts that cooperation will decline as individuals experience multiple 
social dilemmas with different compared to the same group members. The conditional-cooperation 
hypothesis, from behavioral economics, predicts that cooperation will increase as individuals 
experience multiple social dilemmas with different compared to the same group members. We 
employ a laboratory experiment to create consensus between these literatures and find support for 
the conditional-cooperation hypothesis. The positive effect of interacting with different group 
members comes from participants having an opportunity to shift their cooperative behavior from 
the less cooperative to the more cooperative group. 
(Abstract word count = 115) 
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A parent of an honors student involves himself simultaneously on the boards of 
his son’s Boy Scout Troop and the neighborhood Homeowners’ Association. Each 
week he must decide how much time to allocate between these two groups’ 
activities. 
There are a few things that most of us find familiar with this vignette. First, it is often the 
case that the benefits enjoyed in organizations come from the aggregated cooperative behavior of 
individuals (Aquino & Reed, 1998). The catch is that cooperative behavior when organizing 
creates a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980; Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007). A social dilemma is an 
interdependent decision-making situation where “individually reasonable behavior leads to a 
situation in which everyone is worse off than they might have been otherwise” (Kollock, 1998, p. 
183). The social dilemma of organizing is that resources must often be pooled from individuals 
to create synergistic shared benefits but, once produced, these benefits can be enjoyed by 
everyone whether or not their resources were pooled (Olson, 1965). Consequently, an individual 
may choose to not pool her resources; but, if everyone follows this strategy then the synergistic 
shared resources do not materialize.  
A second thing we may find familiar in this vignette is that we are often involved in 
multiple social dilemmas simultaneously. For three decades scholarship in management, public 
policy, and economics has discussed the idea of cooperation in multiple simultaneous social 
dilemmas (Cross & Guyer, 1980; Janssen & Ostrom, 2006) with empirical work beginning to 
emerge. The burgeoning work includes Falk and colleagues’ (2013) laboratory experiment about 
social interaction when participating in multiple social dilemmas with different group members. 
Relatedly, another collection of papers investigate decision-making in multiple different 
environments, but not multiple social dilemmas (Bednar, Chen, Liu, & Page, 2012; Cason, 
Savikhin, & Sheremeta, 2012; McCarter & Sheremeta, 2013; Savikhin & Sheremeta, 2013). We 
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are left with the question: what effect does facing multiple social dilemmas simultaneously with 
same rather than different fellow group members have on cooperation? 
When we turn to the current literature, however, a confusion gap is found (Sandberg & 
Alvesson, 2011): there are competing predictions about how individuals should behave in 
multiple simultaneous social dilemmas depending on the group’s structure. The divided-loyalty 
hypothesis predicts that cooperation will decline as individuals experience multiple simultaneous 
social dilemmas with different compared to the same group members (McCarter & Northcraft, 
2007). The conditional-cooperation hypothesis predicts that cooperation will increase as 
individuals experience multiple simultaneous social dilemmas with different compared to the 
same group members (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). Using a randomized laboratory 
experiment, we seek to “create consensus” (Hollenbeck, 2008) by testing these competing 
hypotheses. In support of the conditional-cooperator hypothesis, we find greater cooperation 
when individuals face multiple social dilemmas with different group members compared to with 
the same group members. The positive effect of interacting with different group members comes 
from participants having an opportunity to shift their cooperative behavior from the less 
cooperative to the more cooperative group. 
Our findings make several contributions to research about social dilemmas and social 
cooperation. Complementing traditional scholarship examining discretion over how resources are 
allocated between self- and collective interests, we consider a different way individuals have 
discretion when attempting collective action: choosing which collective action to undertake. 
Further, we provide preliminary support for the Simonic approach to social cooperation (Simon, 
1996). Contrary to the Hardinic approach (Hardin, 1968) that assumes exploiters in an 
organizational system will persist to the point where cooperators give up and the system fails, we 
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find that cooperators do not give up but, as Simon (1996) would suggest, rather “vote with their 
feet” to achieve cooperation. Lastly, our findings hold practical significance for policymakers 
and managers: organizing individuals to attempt collective action with different groups 
(compared to the same groups) may increase cooperation by over 50%. 
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Social Dilemmas: A Brief Review 
Social dilemmas come in a variety of forms (Dawes, 1980). As outlined in Messick and 
Brewer’s (1983) seminal review, social dilemmas often involve contributing resources. The most 
common example of a social dilemma about contributing resources is the public goods dilemma 
(Samuelson, 1954). Public goods are resources that can be enjoyed by everyone regardless of 
contribution level; moreover, each individual’s enjoyment of the public good does not subtract 
from others’ enjoyment (Olson, 1965). Organizational examples of public goods provision 
include investment in community organizations (e.g., Boy Scouts and home owner associations), 
charitable giving to the non-profit sector (e.g., gifts to the Red Cross) and the impact of generic 
advertising on sales in a particular industry (e.g., ‘Got Milk’ campaigns). 
Non-contributors may benefit equally from the public good, creating an individual 
temptation not to contribute. Due to this temptation, public goods often struggle to be produced 
(Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). This gives rise to the public-goods social dilemma (henceforth public 
goods dilemma). In public goods dilemmas, individuals can cooperate by contributing private 
resources to produce the public good, but they can also defect by not contributing toward the 
public good (Zeng & Chen, 2003). In addition to the temptation to under-contribute toward the 
public good, individuals more often under-contribute defensively (McCarter, Rockmann, & 
Northcraft, 2010): they fear that others will free ride on their contributions (Rockmann & 
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Northcraft, 2008). Consequently individuals contribute more toward the public good when they 
know that others are also contributing (Fischbacher et al., 2001). 
 
Multiple Simultaneous Social Dilemmas: A Confusion Gap in the Literature 
The majority of social dilemma scholarship about public goods examines cooperation and 
defection behavior in the context of producing a single public good (Van Lange, Joireman, 
Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). However, as suggested in Cross and Guyer’s (1980) book on social 
dilemmas, many organizational public goods dilemmas are interconnected, whereby an 
individual faces multiple dilemmas simultaneously. Current social dilemma research has given 
little empirical attention to this observation made over 30 years ago. Further, current social 
dilemma research is divided about predicting patterns of cooperation behavior in multiple 
simultaneous, public goods dilemmas. This division is between the divided loyalties prediction 
maintained from organizational theory and the conditional cooperation prediction from 
behavioral economics. 
 
Divided-loyalist Hypothesis 
Social dilemma scholarship in organization behavior and management observes that 
individuals can be nested simultaneously within multiple groups who are all facing a social 
dilemma (Polzer, Stewart, & Simmons, 1999; Wit & Kerr, 2002). As predicted by McCarter and 
Northcraft (2007), belonging to multiple groups with different members may create a tension of 
allegiances, encouraging an individual to “fear [their partner’s] interests no longer rest with only 
[their group] but with other [groups]” (p. 504). As a consequence of the potential for divided 
loyalties, an individual is motivated to protect her private resources and defensively under-
contribute toward the public good. Scholarship advocating the divided loyalty position would 
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predict that, compared to facing multiple social dilemmas with the same people, facing multiple 
social dilemmas with different people may lead an individual to question the others’ allegiance. 
When comparing same versus different group membership structure, the divided-loyalist 
hypothesis would be: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals will contribute less toward multiple public goods when 
involved in different groups as compared to individuals involved in the same group. 
 
Conditional-cooperation Hypothesis 
Behavioral economics research on conditional cooperation in social dilemmas makes a 
different prediction based on the observation that individuals cooperate more (less) the more 
(less) others cooperate (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Gächter, 2007). Ichino and Maggi’s (2000) field 
study on shirking behavior finds that an individual’s contribution towards a group’s interest is a 
function of how others in the group behave (also termed social [or group] interaction). In 
considering the strong normative influence often imposed on an individual by a group (Deutsch 
& Gerard, 1955), working with different groups on related tasks (as compared to with the same 
group) provides flexibility not only in where to allocate resources but also with whom 
individuals work (O’Leary, Woolley, & Mortensen, 2011).  
Based on this body of work, an alternative prediction to the current research question 
would be that being a member of two groups composed of different participants increases the 
likelihood that conditional cooperators will be able to sustain cooperation (at least in one group 
that is more cooperative). The increase in likelihood of having more cooperators in one of the 
two groups increases the likelihood of others following a cooperative signal. In addition, 
conditional cooperators participating in two groups with different fellow group members may 
use the lower-cooperating group as a reference point with which to compare the higher-
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cooperating group, always contributing more to the higher-cooperating group. In contrast, 
conditional cooperators participating with the same group members do not have this reference 
point since they know that the level of pro-sociality of fellow members across groups should be 
the same (group members in both public goods games are inherently the same type – cooperative 
or not). Thus, we propose the following alternative hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals will contribute more toward multiple public goods when 
involved in different groups compared to individuals involved in the same group. 
 
Method 
Overview of the Experimental Approach 
We tested our hypotheses using a laboratory experiment. Like any research examining 
social behavior, we had to make tradeoffs between generalizability, accuracy and simplicity 
(Thorngate, 1976). Each of these elements affects the external and internal validity of our 
findings (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Laboratory experiments have high internal validity, thus 
providing us with great accuracy in measuring the treatment effect on cooperation (Creswell, 
2008). Further, laboratory experiments provide for the ability to draw straightforward 
conclusions when explaining the relationship between treatment and cooperation. Laboratory 
experiments, however, can be susceptible to low external validity and hence generalizability 
(Creswell, 2008). We chose to use a laboratory experiment because – rather than focusing on the 
ecological validity of context, our research focuses on creating “experimental realism” 
(Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). That is, we were interested in making the relationship 
between cooperation and treatment the focus of the work. 
 
 
 8 
Experimental Design and Procedure  
The study was conducted at a large public university in the Central United States and 
involved a randomized experiment where the group structure variable had two treatments: Same 
and Different.  In the Same treatment, two public goods dilemmas were played simultaneously by 
each individual with the same group members in each public goods dilemma. In the Different 
treatment, two public goods dilemmas were played simultaneously by each individual with one 
set of group members in one of the public goods dilemmas and a set of different group members 
in the other public goods dilemma.  
Participants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students (who are recruited from 
courses across the entire campus, and thus represent many different majors). A total of 104 
individuals participated in 6 sessions, with 40 individuals participating in 2 sessions of the Same 
treatment (20 participants per session) and 64 individuals participating in 4 sessions of the 
Different treatment (16 participants per session). Our randomized experiment utilized the 
procedures outlined by Friedman and Sunder (1994, p. 26) and Cassar and Friedman (2004, p. 
35). We scheduled 4 sessions over the course of 2 days, and assigned each session to either Same 
or Different, balancing by time of day. Then, since the design required additional sessions of 
Different, we scheduled 2 more sessions on another day and assigned those to Different. 
Schedules were assigned to treatment prior to seeing which students came in, and eligible 
students were notified via email to sign up.  To randomize students across treatments, we used a 
computer software program (ORSEE) to randomly select eligible students from the subject pool 
for each session and solicit their participation by email (Greiner, 2004). A participant only 
received solicitation for one session. Participants received monetary incentives, but not course 
credit, for participating. 
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Similar to our Same treatment, existing studies consider simultaneous interaction in 
several public goods, either breaking a single public good into parts or presenting multiple public 
goods. Bernasconi and colleagues (2009) investigate an “unpacked” public goods dilemma, 
comparing contributions when a single group contributes to one public goods dilemma as 
compared to multiple public goods dilemmas, and find that contributions are greater under the 
unpacked treatment, although this increase is not sustained for the duration of the session. Biele 
and colleagues (2009) break up 4-person groups into two 2-person groups, and find that 
participants contribute more in the smaller groups. Similar to our Different treatment, Falk and 
colleagues (2013) investigate contributions in groups of different individuals playing two 
identical public goods dilemmas.  
The main difference of our study as compared to previous work is that we investigate 
simultaneous decision-making both with different and the same group members under a shared 
budget constraint. The direct comparison of same versus different group members allows us to 
expose participants to a controlled set of fellow group members in order to better understand the 
role of conditional cooperation. This is the first study to consider the effect of social interactions 
when groups are different or the same. Unlike most work in this area, our experiment uses a 
shared budget constraint, effectively allowing participants to shift their entire endowment to just 
one of the public goods. This aspect of the design is also more realistic, because in practice 
individuals participate in many environments simultaneously and are constrained by a single 
budget constraint when choosing between various activities.  
The computerized experimental sessions used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to record 
participants’ decisions and also to record the order of decisions. Participants were given the 
instructions, shown in the appendix, at the beginning of the session and the experimenter read the 
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instructions aloud. In each session of the Same treatment, 20 participants were randomly 
assigned to a group of 4 players, and played both games with the same group members. In each 
session of the Different treatment, 16 participants were randomly assigned to a group of 4 players 
in one game and to a different group of 4 players in the other game, such that no participants 
played one game with any of their group members from the other game. Group composition 
remained fixed for all 20 rounds of the experiment in both treatments. All participants 
participated in only one session of this study. 
In each round, the two public goods dilemmas were displayed side by side on the same 
screen. Figure 1a displays the screens participants saw for the Different treatment, and Figure 1b 
displays the screens participants saw for the Same treatment. At the beginning of each round, 
each participant received an endowment of 160 experimental francs, which could be transferred 
between public goods. Each participant chose a portion of the endowment to contribute to one or 
both of the public goods, and chose to keep the remaining portion in a private account. Each 
player’s contribution to the public good was multiplied by 0.4 and the total of all contributions 
given to each of the 4 players in the group in each public goods dilemma. Each participant kept 
the remainder of the 160-franc endowment that he did not allocate to either public good. 
Participants did not know others’ decisions before making their own decisions. After all 
participants made their decisions, the sum of all contributions in each group was displayed on the 
output screen together with the outcome, and earnings in each round were determined as the sum 
of the endowment kept in the private account and the earnings from the public goods. 
Participants recorded their results in a record sheet, and then moved on to the next round. 
At the end of the experiment, two rounds from the game were selected for payment using 
a random draw from a bingo cage. Experimental francs were used throughout the experiment, 
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with a conversion rate of 25 francs = $1. Participants earned $17 on average, and sessions 
(including instruction time) lasted approximately 70 minutes.  
*** Insert Figure 1a about here *** 
*** Insert Figure 1b about here *** 
 
Results 
Table 1 reports the average contributions and payoffs across both treatments, separately 
for each public goods dilemma. We find that in each treatment, participants make relatively 
similar contributions to both public goods on average. Figure 2 displays, by treatment, the 
average contribution (across both public goods dilemmas) over all 20 rounds of the experiment. 
We find that contributions are 56.6% higher when group composition is different across 
both public goods dilemmas as compared to when composition is the same across the two public 
goods dilemmas (M1 = 17.7, SD1 = 13.2, n1 = 64 versus M2 = 11.3, SD2 = 14.2, n2 = 40; means 
reported in experimental ‘francs’). Not only this result is practically significant (McCloskey & 
Ziliak, 1996), but it is also statistically different. Comparing the two treatments using a two-
sample t-test finds these means to be statistically different at the 5% level, p = 0.02.1 The same 
statistical conclusion is supported even when using a conservative non-parametric test that treats 
each group of participants as one independent observation (M1 = 17.7, SD1 = 4.4, n1 = 4 versus 
M2 = 11.3, SD2 = 12.8, n2 = 10; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.05).
2  
The results above provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 2, suggesting that 
individuals contribute more toward multiple public goods when involved in different groups as 
compared to when involved in the same groups. However, these results do not refute the 
existence of divided loyalists, but simply provide evidence for the existence of conditional 
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cooperators. Indeed, it may be the case that divided loyalists exist alongside conditional 
cooperators; but in our experiment conditional cooperators are observed significantly more than 
divided loyalists and thus we find support for Hypothesis 2. 
***Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here *** 
 
Identifying Cooperators 
Hypothesis 2 suggests conditional cooperation as an explanation for the difference in 
cooperation between the Same treatment and the Different treatment. In the below, we define 
cooperators as participants who contribute more than 75% of their endowment. These are the 
individuals who either have an intrinsic motivation to be more cooperative, or cooperate based 
on observing other cooperators in earlier rounds. Table 2 reports the distribution of cooperators 
as a percentage of the total number of individuals. Comparing the two treatments, we find that in 
the first round of the experiment there are more cooperators (18.8% more) in the Same treatment 
than in the Different treatment, but the difference is not statistically different (M1 = 0.203, SD1 = 
0.051, n1 = 64 versus M2 = 0.250, SD2 = 0.069, n2 = 40; t-test, p = 0.71). However, in the last 10 
rounds of the experiment, there are twice as many cooperators left in the Different treatment than 
in the Same treatment, and the difference is statistically different at the 10% level (M1 = 0.059, 
SD1 = 0.017, n1 = 64 versus M2 = 0.025, SD2 = 0.009, n2 = 40; t-test, p = 0.07). This observation 
provides additional support for Hypothesis 2, suggesting that participants who interact with two 
different groups of individuals may learn how to maintain cooperation better than participants 
who interact with only one group of individuals. 
*** Insert Table 2 about here *** 
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How do participants maintain better cooperation in the Different treatment as compared 
to the Same treatment? Table 3 displays the average contribution in round t conditional on group 
contribution in round t-1. When examining the Different treatment, we find that if group 
contribution in round t-1 to the first public good is greater than group contribution to the second 
public good, participants choose to contribute 121% more in round t to the first public good. If 
the group contribution in round t-1 to the second public good is greater than the group 
contribution to the first public good, participants choose to contribute 171% more in round t to 
the second public good. These findings suggest that participants in the Different treatment shift 
their contributions to the public goods dilemmas with higher cooperation rates – thereby acting 
as conditional cooperators between games. 
When examining the Same treatment, we find a similar type of behavior; however, the 
magnitude of shifts is much lower. If group contribution in round t-1 to the first public good is 
greater than group contribution to the second public good, participants choose to contribute 40% 
more in round t to the first public good than to the second public good (12.8 vs. 9.1). Similarly, if 
the group contribution in round t-1 to the second public good is more than the group contribution 
to the first public good, participants choose to contribute 76% more in round t to the second 
public good than to the first public good (11.3 vs. 6.4). The finding that participants in the 
Different treatment shift their contributions much more than participants in the Same treatment is 
statistically different at the 5% level and can help explain the difference in overall cooperation 
rates between treatments (t-test, both p’s < 0.05; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, both p’s < 0.05).3 
Additional evidence of greater shifting of contributions in the Different treatment relative 
to the Same treatment comes from comparing the number of instances when participants choose 
to contribute more than half of their endowment to one of the public goods dilemmas. 
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Specifically, we find that in the Different treatment, participants transfer more than half of their 
endowment to one of the two public goods dilemmas 5.5% of the time. On the other hand, in the 
Same treatment the transfer rate is less than half or 2.3% of instances. The difference in these 
transfer rates are statistically different at the 5% level for the individual level analysis and 10% 
level at the group level of analysis (t-test, p = 0.04, n1 = 64, n2 = 40; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 
0.10, n1 = 4, n2 = 10). Note that the number of participants who transfer more than half may be 
low overall because participants tend to keep a large portion of their endowment rather than give 
it to the public good. Our findings comport with the results of Falk and colleagues (2013) where 
it was found that individuals participating in public goods dilemmas with different group 
members and found evidence for social interactions: individuals contribute more to groups in 
which others are also contributing. 
*** Insert Table 3 about here *** 
 
Analyzing the Determinants of Contributions 
Table 4 reports estimates of panel regressions conducted separately for each public goods 
dilemma. In these regressions, the dependent variable is participant’s contribution to the first 
public good (regression models 1 and 3) and to the second public good (regression models 2 and 
4). The independent variables are contribution-1-lag (lagged individual contribution to the first 
public good), contribution-2-lag (lagged individual contribution to the second public good), 
group-contribution-1-lag (lagged group contribution to the first public good), and group-
contribution-2-lag (lagged group contribution to the second public good). All regressions use a 
random effects error structure for the individual participants to account for repeated measures, a 
period trend to account for learning, and include a constant. Standard errors are clustered at the 
matching group level. 
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In the Same treatment, according to the estimation results in regression (model 1), the 
main determinants of contribution in the first public good are contribution-1-lag and group-
contribution-1-lag, indicating that the two major factors influencing contributions are an 
individual disposition towards cooperation (i.e., tendency of a participant to contribute 
continually to the public good) and social interaction (i.e., contributing to the first public good 
conditional on group cooperation level). Similar results are reported in regression (model 2) for 
the second public good of the Same treatment. 
In the Different treatment, the determinants of contribution are more complex. According 
to the estimation results in regression (model 3), the determinants of contribution in the first 
public good are contribution-1-lag contribution-2-lag, suggesting strong individual disposition 
effects. Further, the contribution in the first public good is positively correlated with group-
contribution-1-lag and negatively correlated with group-contribution-2-lag. The positive 
correlation suggests that in the Different treatment, conditional cooperators are more responsive 
to the behavior of the two groups. Conditional cooperators contribute more to the first public 
good if they observe cooperative behavior in the first public good in the previous round, but they 
contribute less to the first public good if they observe more cooperative behavior in the second 
public good in the previous round. This is also true when we examine regression (model 4) for 
the second public good. Overall, these findings reveal a mechanism used by individuals to 
achieve higher cooperation in the Different treatment than in the Same treatment: participants in 
the Different treatment conditionally shift their contributions from a less cooperative group to a 
more cooperative group (there is no such evidence in the Same treatment). 
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** 
 
 16 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We experimentally investigated simultaneous decision-making in two public goods 
dilemmas with different and same group members. In our two treatments, participants were 
limited by a single budget constraint and chose how to allocate their endowment across two 
public goods and a private account. We found that the choice of contribution when facing 
multiple social dilemmas with different groups led to greater overall cooperation (56.6% more) 
compared to same groups. The difference in cooperation is because conditional cooperators were 
able to band together. This finding supports the conditional-cooperator hypothesis (from the 
behavioral economics literature) compared to the divided-loyalist hypothesis (from the 
organizational theory literature). Although participants have inherent individual disposition 
towards cooperation (i.e., their contributions are correlated across different rounds of the 
experiment), they are also conditionally cooperative (i.e., their contributions are correlated with 
their group contributions across different rounds of the experiment). Moreover, we find that over 
the course of the experiment, participants playing with different group members shift their 
contributions significantly more (about 4 times more) towards more cooperative groups than 
participants playing with the same group members.4 
 
Implications and Future Research Directions 
Messick and Brewer’s (1983) seminal paper outlines several guidelines for assessing a 
study’s contributions to the social dilemma literature. The first guideline is about advancing our 
understanding about a common type of social dilemma. The second guideline involves 
contributing to scholarly conversation outside the social dilemma domain. Messick and Brewer’s 
third criterion concerns the practical significance of a study’s finding in relation to public policy 
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and management. Following these guidelines, our findings push our thinking about social 
dilemmas and social cooperation in several ways. 
Implications for social dilemma research. We introduce an alternative form of discretion 
into the conversation of social dilemmas in organizations. Discretion refers to the “latitude of 
actions available to a [decision maker]” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990, p. 484). When we talk 
about discretion in social dilemmas, we are often referring to discretion about whether or not to 
cooperate, defect, or sanction defectors (e.g., De Cremer & van Dijk, 2009; Polzer et al., 1999). 
Our study introduces a different form of discretion: discretion over which collective action to 
undertake. Of course, individuals can always decide whether to assist or impede collective 
action, but our study observes that individuals can also decide which collective action to assist 
and which to impede. Examining this different source of discretion in the conversation of social 
dilemmas enhances the paradigm’s ecological validity and leaves room for answering the trans-
paradigmatic question, what can collectives do to look attractive to conditional cooperators?   
In our study, the attractiveness of a social dilemma was constituted by how many 
cooperators were present. However, as observed by Weber et al. (2004), when a person faces a 
social dilemma, the person not only considers the incentives but also subconsciously asks and 
answers the question “What does a person like me do in a social dilemma like this?” In other 
words, decisions are made on “logics of appropriateness” in addition to logics of consequences 
(Messick, 1999). The idea of the logic of appropriateness is that individuals make their decisions 
based on the perceived context of the situation, that individual’s role in the situation, and the 
rules appropriate to that situation (March, 1994).  
In relation to appropriateness logic, we know that whether a social dilemma is framed as 
a business decision or moral decision impacts an individual’s cooperation tendencies 
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(Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). We also know that cooperation changes as a function of an 
individual role as a leader or a follower in social dilemmas (De Cremer, 2003). Indeed, recent 
scholarship reminds us that relative wealth is a cue that affects whether an individual deems it 
appropriate to be cooperative or not (McCarter, Budescu, & Scheffran, 2011). Using the logic of 
appropriateness, future scholarship may address the questions “How decision frames impact a 
person’s choice of being a divided loyalist or a consistent cooperator?”, “What cues from the 
situation affect how a person perceives their role in the social dilemma?”, and “How does this 
role perception moderate the framing effect?”  It could be that framing multiple simultaneous 
social dilemmas as moral decisions increase cooperation across dilemmas but this increase is 
moderated by the wealth the players have in relation to each other.  
In relation to the management research domain of cooperation, our paper patterns after 
recent advancements placing greater focus on the processes individuals – be they people or firms 
– use to manage cooperation dilemmas in organizations. Whereas previous research examines 
how process, as well as structural, elements affect satisfaction with partners when cooperating 
(Lui & Ngo, 2005) the current paper examines how changes in group structure (same versus 
different groups) affect the cooperation processes individuals use to achieve collective action. 
Considering previous work examining how communication processes (with words) affect 
cooperation behavior in organizational social dilemmas (Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999), 
future research may profit from examining whether cooperation processes of behavior speak 
louder than cooperation processes of words.  
Implications for social cooperation research. In a broader sense, our paper shifts the 
discussion about social cooperation from the well-studied Hardinic approach to the less-
examined Simonic approach. The Hardinic approach – named after Garrett Hardin (1968) – 
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predicts that, without coercion from a central authority, individuals will rarely achieve collective 
action because of greed and fear of exploitation. In other words, the Hardinic approach maintains 
that without coercion, organizational systems become pejoristic systems or systems that perform 
worse over time (Hardin, 1974). The divided-loyalist hypothesis is a Hardinic hypothesis: it 
predicts that an individual will think the worst of (other individuals in) the situation and, 
consequentially, will not cooperate to produce public goods (McCarter & Northcraft, 2007).  
In contrast to Hardin’s approach, the Simonic approach – named after Julian Simon 
(1996) – suggests that, given the right institution or market structure, individuals will find 
creative ways (without coercion) to change their circumstances, achieve collective action, and 
consequently enhance social welfare. In other words, the Simonic approach maintains that, given 
the opportunity (and without coercion), individuals will make an organizational system into a 
melioristic one, where the system performs better over time. The conditional-cooperator 
hypothesis is a Simonic one. The conditional-cooperator hypothesis is about individuals looking 
for the best in the situation – i.e., they will seek out and find cooperators just like themselves – 
and find a way to achieve collective action.  
Our findings provide preliminary support for Simon’s position in the conversation of 
social cooperation. It seems that organizational systems attempting collective action can perform 
better when individuals are given the discretion of who to work with when creating value. 
Considering that Simon’s work is only mentioned in a handful of social dilemma articles and 
book chapters (i.e., Gifford, 2008a, 2008b, 2011; Koger & Winter, 2010), future social dilemma 
research may benefit from examining how Simon and Hardin’s views complement one another.5  
Implications for policy. Our last contribution is a “sizable” one for policy makers and 
managers. From sociology (Gold, 1969) to psychology (Kirk, 1996), and from economics 
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(McCloskey & Ziliak, 1996) to management (Orlitzky, 2012), scholarship suggests that assessing 
the size of an effect is just as critical as assessing whether there is an effect. We find not only the 
difference between the treatments is different statistically at the conventional level, but it is 
practically significant – the difference in cooperation between the two treatments is 56.6%. 
Should these findings hold in magnitude to other contexts, our findings provide insights about 
institutional design. For instance, an administrator faced with a task of assigning individuals to 
work teams may increase economic welfare by assigning individuals to work with different, 
rather than same, team members. Future work would benefit from replicating our results in 
different contexts and populations to enhance their generalizability.  
One of the current paper’s authors recently saw a bumper sticker that read “If you don’t 
like it here, then move!” Indeed, in studying how cooperation develops in multiple simultaneous 
social dilemmas, we found that people follow the bumper sticker’s advice. People vote with their 
feet when it comes to attempting collective action. In support of the conditional-cooperator 
hypothesis applied to public goods dilemmas, those wishing to enhance social welfare find 
another place to go and in so doing find others with the same wish of achieving collective action. 
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Statistical Analysis Addendum 
STATA/IC version 12 was used throughout the paper to conduct our analyses. All t-tests 
use command ttest and non-parametric t-tests use command ranksum (the Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney test). Random effect regression models used command xtreg with cl option for 
clustering. All data are available from the authors upon request. 
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Endnotes 
1 In conducting this t-test, we used the average contribution per participant across both 
public goods dilemmas and over all 20 periods of play as one observation. 
2 In the Same treatment one independent observation is a group of 4 participants (40 
participants = 10 groups = 10 independent observations), while in the Different treatment one 
independent observation is one session (64 participants = 4 sessions = 4 independent 
observations). 
3 We constructed 10 independent observations in the Same treatment (40 participants = 
10 groups = 10 independent observations) and 4 observations in the Different treatment (64 
participants = 4 sessions = 4 independent observations). Each observation was the average 
difference between the contribution to the first public good (second public good) and second 
public good (first public good), conditional on higher group contribution to the first public good 
(second public good) in the previous round. 
4 Existence of conditional cooperators, however, does not refute existence of divided 
loyalists. Indeed, it may be the case that divided loyalists exist alongside conditional cooperators. 
But, in our experiment conditional cooperators significantly outperform divided loyalists, and 
thus we find support for Hypothesis 2. 
5 Indeed, the Hardinic approach is more popular than the Simonic approach. A search on 
Google Scholar (February 27, 2014) comparing the frequency of papers about “social 
cooperation” or “social decision making”, that cite Hardin’s (1968) seminal article The tragedy 
of the commons to Simon’s (1996) seminal book The ultimate resource 2, finds the number of 
papers to be 559 for Hardin and 35 for Simon. Another search on Google Scholar (February 27, 
2014) comparing the frequency of papers discussing a “social dilemma” finds that cite Hardin to 
Simon finds the number of papers to be 1,470 for Hardin and 7 for Simon. The asymmetric 
pattern holds when we control for the total number of citations for each work: 2.4% (559/23,194) 
versus 1.6% (35/2,204) for the “social cooperation / social decision making” search and 6.3% 
(1,470/23,194) versus .03% (7/2,204) for the “social dilemma” search.  
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Table 1: Contribution to public goods is higher in the Different treatment than in the Same 
treatment 
 
Treatment  Contribution Payoff 
Same 
Same-1 11.8 (17.4) 7.1 (12.0) 
Same-2 10.8 (13.0) 6.5 (10.4) 
Average 11.3 (14.2) 6.8 (10.3) 
Different 
Different-1 16.4 (15.2) 9.8 (12.3) 
Different-2 19.1 (17.1) 11.4 (13.6) 
Average 17.7 (13.2) 10.6 (10.2) 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Means reported in 
experimental francs. Key comparison bolded. 
 
 
 
  
 29 
Table 2: There are twice as many cooperators in the Different treatment than in the Same 
treatment in the last 10 rounds of the experiment 
 
Treatment Round Cooperators 
Same 
1 25.0% 
2-10 8.3% 
11-20 2.5% 
Different 
1 20.3% 
2-10 8.5% 
11-20 5.9% 
Key comparison bolded. 
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Table 3: The percentage shift of contribution towards more cooperative group in the 
Different treatment is much higher than in the Same treatment 
 
Treatment 
 Group Contribution  
in Round t-1 
Contribution 
 in Round t 
Percentage Shift of 
Contribution 
Same 
Same-1 Same-1 ≥ Same-2 12.8 (26.2) 40% 
Same-2 Same-1 ≥ Same-2 9.1 (20.6)  
Same-1 Same-1 < Same-2 6.4 (14.5)  
Same-2 Same-1 < Same-2 11.3 (19.5) 76% 
Different 
Different-1 Different-1 ≥ Different-2 19.7 (32.6) 121% 
Different-2 Different-1 ≥ Different-2 8.9 (18.4)  
Different-1 Different-1 < Different-2 10.7 (19.1)  
Different-2 Different-1 < Different-2 29.0 (30.0) 171% 
Standard deviation in parentheses. The percentage shift of contribution towards more cooperative 
group in the Different treatment (121% and 171%) is much higher than in the Same treatment (40% 
and 76%). Key comparison bolded. 
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Table 4: Random effect models of individual contributions 
 
Treatment Same Different 
Individual  
Contribution in 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Same-1 Same-2 Different-1 Different-2 
contribution-1-lag 0.29** 0.11 0.27*** 0.08* 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.03) (0.04) 
contribution -2-lag 0.04 0.30*** 0.07** 0.47*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) 
group- contribution -1-lag 0.13*** 0.01 0.12*** -0.04*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
group- contribution -2-lag 0.01 0.08*** -0.01** 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) 
round -9.01 -0.09 -5.76 9.58 
 (6.50) (5.45) (5.99) (6.42) 
constant 1.38 1.26 3.16*** 1.84** 
 (0.86) (1.20) (1.01) (0.80) 
Observations 760 760 1216 1216 
Number of clusters 10 10 4 4 
Overall R-squared 0.49 0.36 0.29 0.47 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the group 
level. Random effect models conducted using STATA/IC version 12 and command xtreg with 
cl option for clustering. 
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Figure 1a: Decision-making screen for the Different treatment 
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Figure 1b: Decision-making screen for the Same treatment 
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Figure 2: The average contribution across rounds is greater for the Different Condition 
than the Same Condition 
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Appendix  
Instructions for the Same Treatment 
In this experiment you will participate in two games. Each of the two games will have four 
participants, including you. You will not know the identity of the participants you are grouped with. The 
experiment will consist of 20 periods. You will participate in a BLUE GAME and a GREEN GAME at 
the same time. BLUE GAME and GREEN GAME have exactly the same rules. You will participate in the 
BLUE GAME with the same three participants. You will participate in the GREEN GAME with the same 
three participants. All three other participants you are matched with for the GREEN GAME are the same 
as the participants you are matched with for the BLUE GAME. The BLUE GAME will appear on the left 
side of the screen and the GREEN GAME will appear on the right side of the screen at the same time in all 
20 periods.  
At the end of the experiment 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment. After you 
have completed all periods two tokens will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens 
numbered from 1 to 20. The token numbers determine which two periods are going to be paid.  
Each period you will be given 160 francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the 
experiment at the rate of 25 francs = $1. Each period, you will select an allocation for BLUE GAME and 
an allocation for GREEN GAME. When you are ready to make your decision, click on the “input boxes” 
below “How much would you like to allocate to Group Account in BLUE GAME?” and “How much would 
you like to allocate to Group Account in GREEN GAME?” and the program will allow you to enter in your 
number choices. When you are finished making your choices, click “Submit”. You can allocate as much or 
as little of your francs as you like in each period, but remember that the total francs you choose to allocate 
must not exceed 160 francs in each period. You keep any francs which you do not allocate; therefore, 
your earnings are the sum of the francs you decided to keep, your earnings from BLUE GAME, and your 
earnings from GREEN GAME. 
 
BLUE (GREEN) GAME 
Below, we will read instructions for the BLUE GAME. However, the rules for the BLUE GAME 
and the GREEN GAME are exactly the same.  
Each period you will decide how much of your endowment you want to allocate to a Group 
Account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 160, as long as the total number 
of francs used for allocations in both games does not exceed 160. After all participants have made their 
decisions, your outcome for the period is calculated.  
Your period outcome from BLUE GAME depends on the total number of francs allocated to the 
Group Account by all 4 group members (including you). In particular, your earnings from the Group 
Account are 40 percent of the total allocation of all 4 group members (including you) to the Group 
Account. Therefore, for every franc you allocate to the Group Account, you increase the total allocation to 
the Group Account by 1 franc. Therefore, your earnings from the Group Account rise by 0.4×1=0.4 francs. 
And the earnings of the other group members also rise by 0.4 francs each, so that the total earnings of the 
group from the Group Account rise by 1.6 francs. 
In summary, your period outcome in BLUE GAME is determined as follows: 
BLUE GAME Outcome = (earnings from Group Account) – (your allocation to the Group 
Account) =  
 = 0.4×(allocation of 4 group members to Group Acct.) – (your allocation to Group Acct.) 
Example: Suppose that you allocated 40 francs to the Group Account and that the other three 
members of your group allocated a total of 120 francs. This makes a total of 160 francs in the Group 
Account. In this case each member of the group receives earnings from the Group Account of 0.4×160 = 
64 francs, which is also each member’s period outcome in the BLUE GAME. 
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TOTAL EARNINGS 
After you choose how much to allocate to the Group Account in the BLUE GAME and how much 
to allocate to the Group Account in the GREEN GAME, the remainder of your 160 francs will be allocated 
to your Individual Account. Your earnings from the Individual Account equal to the francs that you keep 
for yourself and do not depend on the decisions of others. Therefore, for every franc you keep for yourself 
in your Individual Account, you earn 1 franc. 
Your total earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment if the current 
period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. Your total earnings for each period will be 
calculated as: 
Total Earnings = (160) + (Outcome from BLUE GAME) + (Outcome from GREEN GAME) =  
Which is the same as 
= 160+(Earnings from Group Account in BLUE GAME)–(allocation to Group Account in 
BLUE GAME)  
 +(Earnings from Group Account in GREEN GAME)–(allocation to Group Account in GREEN 
GAME) 
 
OUTCOME SCREEN 
At the end of each period, your allocation, the sum of all allocations in your group for each of 
BLUE GAME and GREEN GAME, and the outcome for each of BLUE GAME and GREEN GAME are 
reported on the outcome screen. The computer will also display your income from the individual account 
and your total earnings for the period. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results 
for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
At the end of the experiment 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment. Your 
earnings for these two periods will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of 
25 francs = $1. 
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Instructions for the Different Treatment 
In this experiment you will participate in two games. Each of the two games will have four 
participants, including you. You will not know the identity of the participants you are grouped with. The 
experiment will consist of 20 periods. You will participate in a BLUE GAME and a GREEN GAME at 
the same time. BLUE GAME and GREEN GAME have exactly the same rules. You will participate in the 
BLUE GAME with the same three participants. You will participate in the GREEN GAME with the same 
three participants. However, all three other participants you are matched with for the GREEN GAME 
are different from the participants you are matched with for the BLUE GAME. The BLUE GAME will 
appear on the left side of the screen and the GREEN GAME will appear on the right side of the screen at 
the same time in all 20 periods.  
At the end of the experiment 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment. After you 
have completed all periods two tokens will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens 
numbered from 1 to 20. The token numbers determine which two periods are going to be paid.  
Each period you will be given 160 francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the 
experiment at the rate of 25 francs = $1. Each period, you will select an allocation for BLUE GAME and 
an allocation for GREEN GAME. When you are ready to make your decision, click on the “input boxes” 
below “How much would you like to allocate to Group Account in BLUE GAME?” and “How much would 
you like to allocate to Group Account in GREEN GAME?” and the program will allow you to enter in your 
number choices. When you are finished making your choices, click “Submit”. You can allocate as much or 
as little of your francs as you like in each period, but remember that the total francs you choose to allocate 
must not exceed 160 francs in each period. You keep any francs which you do not allocate; therefore, 
your earnings are the sum of the francs you decided to keep, your earnings from BLUE GAME, and your 
earnings from GREEN GAME. 
 
BLUE (GREEN) GAME 
Below, we will read instructions for the BLUE GAME. However, the rules for the BLUE GAME 
and the GREEN GAME are exactly the same. The only difference is that all three participants you are matched 
with for the GREEN GAME are different from the participants you are matched with for the BLUE GAME.   
Each period you will decide how much of your endowment you want to allocate to a Group 
Account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 160, as long as the total number 
of francs used for allocations in both games does not exceed 160. After all participants have made their 
decisions, your outcome for the period is calculated.  
Your period outcome from BLUE GAME depends on the total number of francs allocated to the 
Group Account by all 4 group members (including you). In particular, your earnings from the Group 
Account are 40 percent of the total allocation of all 4 group members (including you) to the Group 
Account. Therefore, for every franc you allocate to the Group Account, you increase the total allocation to 
the Group Account by 1 franc. Therefore, your earnings from the Group Account rise by 0.4×1=0.4 francs. 
And the earnings of the other group members also rise by 0.4 francs each, so that the total earnings of the 
group from the Group Account rise by 1.6 francs. 
In summary, your period outcome in BLUE GAME is determined as follows: 
BLUE GAME Outcome = (earnings from Group Account) – (your allocation to the Group 
Account) =  
 = 0.4×(allocation of 4 group members to Group Acct.) – (your allocation to Group Acct.) 
Example: Suppose that you allocated 40 francs to the Group Account and that the other three 
members of your group allocated a total of 120 francs. This makes a total of 160 francs in the Group 
Account. In this case each member of the group receives earnings from the Group Account of 0.4×160 = 
64 francs, which is also each member’s period outcome in the BLUE GAME. 
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TOTAL EARNINGS 
After you choose how much to allocate to the Group Account in the BLUE GAME and how much 
to allocate to the Group Account in the GREEN GAME, the remainder of your 160 francs will be allocated 
to your Individual Account. Your earnings from the Individual Account equal to the francs that you keep 
for yourself and do not depend on the decisions of others. Therefore, for every franc you keep for yourself 
in your Individual Account, you earn 1 franc. 
Your total earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment if the current 
period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. Your total earnings for each period will be 
calculated as: 
Total Earnings = (160) + (Outcome from BLUE GAME) + (Outcome from GREEN GAME) =  
Which is the same as 
= 160+(Earnings from Group Account in BLUE GAME)–(allocation to Group Account in 
BLUE GAME)  
 +(Earnings from Group Account in GREEN GAME)–(allocation to Group Account in GREEN 
GAME) 
 
OUTCOME SCREEN 
At the end of each period, your allocation, the sum of all allocations in your group for each of 
BLUE GAME and GREEN GAME, and the outcome for each of BLUE GAME and GREEN GAME are 
reported on the outcome screen. The computer will also display your income from the individual account 
and your total earnings for the period. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results 
for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
At the end of the experiment 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment. Your 
earnings for these two periods will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of 
25 francs = $1. 
 
